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INTRODUCTION 
Are independent agencies truly independent of presidential control? By 
placing limits on the President's power to appoint and remove independent 
agency heads as well as mandating limits on the number of the President's own 
partisans that can be appointed, Congress made use of an institutional design 
that sought to limit presidential control of independent agencies. 1 But do these 
statutory limits, in fact, protect independent agencies from presidential 
domination? After all, commissioners need not serve out their term, so it may 
be that a President is able to appoint a majority of commissioners shortly after 
he takes office. Moreover, partisan rules may be ineffectual, as Presidents may 
appoint turncoats from the opposition party. For example, a Democratic 
President may appoint a Republican whose politics are more closely allied with 
Democrats than with Republicans. 
In the pages that follow, we will examine these questions through an 
empirical analysis of presidential control of independent agencies. 
Specifically, we will look at turnover rates among commissioners, the impact 
of party turnover in the White House on these rates, the amount of time that it 
takes a President to get his nominees through the Senate, and whether 
commissioners from the party not in the White House ("opposition-party" 
commissioners) are loyal to their party or to the President who appointed them. 
• Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of William and 
Mary. 
•• Assistant Professor of Politics and Public Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School of Public 
and International Affairs, Princeton University. Thanks to Gary Lawson for asking us to 
participate in The Role of the Presidency in the 21st Century Conference. Thanks to Chris 
Casey, Brian Sterling, and especially Pierce Blue for research assistance. 
1 See discussion infra Part I. 
459 
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By examining these various measures of commissioner partisanship and the 
President's ability to advance his policy agenda through independent agencies, 
we will gain a handle on whether congressional efforts to statutorily limit 
presidential control of independent agencies, in fact, meaningfully limit the 
President. 2 
Our initial hypothesis was that commissioner turnover was sufficiently great 
that statutory limits on presidential powers to appoint and remove independent 
agency heads did not impose any severe constraints. When we first started 
talking about writing this paper around 2003, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) had just relaxed rules governing the cross-ownership of 
television stations and newspapers. 3 This policy change seemed directly tied 
to commissioner turnover at the FCC and, correspondingly, to President 
Bush's ability to appoint commissioners who agreed with his policy 
preferences. Shortly after his 2001 inauguration, President Bush appointed to 
the FCC two Republican commissioners, Kevin Martin and Kathleen 
Abernathy, and a Democratic commissioner, Michael J. Copps, who previously 
worked for a conservative southern Democrat.4 We speculated that these three 
appointments allowed Bush to quickly transform the FCC into an agency that 
would advance his policy priorities - so much so that the line separating 
presidential influence over independent agencies from presidential influence 
over executive agencies became blurred. 
The data, as we will soon discuss, do not support our initial thesis about 
commissioner turnover and the speed at which Presidents can appoint a 
majority of ideologically-simpatico commissioners.5 But the data do support 
an even more interesting hypothesis - one that suggests greater presidential 
control of independent agencies, although for reasons quite different than we 
2 Most of our empirical analysis is original. Others, however, have examined related 
questions. In particular, Daniel Ho wrote a first-rate study on the impact of statutory 
partisan requirements on presidential control of independent agencies. See Daniel E. Ho, 
Congressional Agency Control: The Impact of Statutory Partisan Requirements on 
Regulation 18-31 (Am. Law & Econ. Ass'n, Working Paper No. 73, 2007), available at 
http://law.bepress.com/alea/17th/art73/. Ho's study helped shape our thinking and we will 
refer to it on several occasions in this Article. 
3 See In re 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review- Review of the Commission's Broadcast 
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620, 13,790-91 (2003); see also 
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004) (reviewing the validity of 
the proposed 2003 rules). 
4 Press Release, White House, President Bush Nominates Six Individuals To Serve in His 
Administration (April 6, 2001 ), available at http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
2001/04/20010406-7.htrnl. In 2005, Bush appointed Kevin Martin to be chair of the FCC. 
Press Release, FCC, Kevin J. Martin Sworn in as Communications Commissioner (July 3, 
2001 ), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Miscellaneous/News_Releases/200 11 
nrmcO lll.htrnl. 
5 See discussion infra Part II. 
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had initially suspected.6 Specifically, contrary to what we had thought, it is 
taking Presidents longer and longer to appoint a majority of commissioners 
from their political party.7 Furthermore, opposition-party commissioners are 
not turncoats loyal to the President who appoints them; instead, today's 
opposition-party commissioners are ideological partisans committed to the 
agenda of the opposition party.8 Thus, statutory limits on the President's 
appointment and removal powers are effective: opposition-party members do 
not share the President's priorities and Presidents are unable to quickly appoint 
a majority of commissioners. 
The political polarization of Democrats and Republicans seems to account 
for these two phenomena. Opposition-party senators agree with each other and 
disagree with the policy priorities of the President and his party. 
Consequently, opposition-party senators make use of holds and other delaying 
strategies to see to it that the President nominates opposition-party 
Commissioners loyal to the opposition party, not to the President. At the same 
time, party polarization also explains why today's independent agencies are 
more likely to agree with presidential preferences once the President appoints a 
majority of his party to the agency. In particular, party polarization between 
Democrats and Republicans means that party identity is an especially good 
proxy for commissioner ideology. A majority Republican commission is likely 
to agree with the policy priorities of a Republican President; a majority 
Democratic commission is likely to resist those policy priorities.9 In 
demonstrating how party polarization shapes commissioner identity and 
behavior, we highlight differences between today' s independent agencies and 
pre-1980 independent agencies. Before 1980, modest party polarization was 
the norm and, correspondingly, opposition-party senators did not use delaying 
strategies to advance their agenda. Likewise, party identity was a less useful 
proxy in predicting commissioner behavior. For these and other reasons, we 
see the Reagan presidency as transformative - separating a period of modest 
party polarization from a period of ever-increasing polarization. 
In examining the profound impact of party polarization on presidential 
control of independent agencies, our Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I 
discusses how Congress uses the institutional design of independent agencies 
to limit presidential control of these agencies. This discussion underscores the 
primacy of appointment and removal limits to that institutional design. Part II 
looks at whether Congress's institutional design works- looking at data about 
commissioner turnover and lag times between presidential nomination and 
6 See discussion infra Part IV. 
7 See discussion infra Part II. 
8 See discussion infra Part III. 
9 See discussion infra Part II. This is especially true on high-salience issues - where 
Democrats and Republicans are likely to disagree with each other. See discussion infra Part 
II. For this reason, some independent commissions are more likely to be politicized than 
others. 
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Senate confirmation. Part III will detail how party polarization contributes to 
changes in commissioner turnover and time lags between nomination and 
confirmation, and extends the analysis that takes place in Part II by comparing 
commissioner turnover and lag times before and after the Reagan presidency. 
Part III will also discuss how party polarization translates into the appointment 
of commissioners who are far more likely to be party loyalists. In particular, 
the opposition party in the Senate will make use of holds and other delaying 
strategies (often on nominees from the President's own party) to ensure the 
President appoints opposition-party commissioners who are acceptable to 
opposition-party leaders. Part IV will serve both as a conclusion and as an 
opportunity for us to discuss how changes in the appointment and confirmation 
of commissioners influence presidential control of independent agencies. For 
reasons already noted, we will argue that Presidents - once there is a majority 
of commissioners from the President's party - have more influence on 
independent-agency policymaking than ever before. Party polarization 
translates into party loyalty, meaning independent-agency heads from the 
President's party are less likely to disagree with the President. 10 
I. THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
Congress's decision to designate an agency as independent (i.e., not under 
the control of some cabinet agency or the Executive Office of the President) is 
intended to limit presidential contro1. 11 After winning the White House, a 
newly elected President - so the theory goes - cannot control independent-
agency decision making. 12 Instead, statutory partisan requirements, fixed 
statutory terms, and for-cause limits on commissioner removal all work against 
presidential control. 13 More to the point, assuming that some opposition-party 
commissioners serve out their terms, a newly elected President will inherit a 
commission that is likely to have members (perhaps a majority) that disagree 
with his policy priorities. That is why the Senate Committee on Government 
Operations spoke of partisan requirements as "an important restraint on the 
President. " 14 
10 See discussion infra Part III. 
11 See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government Separation of Powers and 
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 589-91 (1984) . 
. 
12 See generally Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and 
Personnel Before a President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557 (2003). 
13 See DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN 3-4 (2003). 
14 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, 95TH CONG., STUDY ON FEDERAL 
REGULATION: THE REGULATORY APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 31 {1977); see also PETER L. 
STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 95-96 (2d ed. 2002); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 103 (2000) 
(opining that partisan membership requirements in independent regulatory commissions 
may reduce an agency's tendency toward political polarization). 
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Some combination of concerns about expertise, due process, and the likely 
administrative actions of Presidents explains Congress's decision to constrain 
the President this way. 15 Commission expertise is the traditional, "good 
government" justification for Congress's choice to create independent 
agencies. 16 Pointing to their inability to deal with the details of complex, 
sectoral regulation in the legislative process, lawmakers see independent 
agencies as a particularly good institutional design to offset limitations in the 
legislative processP As one member said in the debate over the creation of 
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC): "How much better this [the 
proposal for an independent commission] is than to fix in advance by inflexible 
law the whole body of rules to govern the most complex business known to our 
civilization."18 On this view, members of Congress have neither the expertise 
nor the time to manage complicated and rapidly changing regulatory issues. 
Independent agencies are preferred to executive agencies because long 
commissioner tenure, staggered terms, and political insulation are intended to 
facilitate a non-political environment where regulatory experts can apply their 
knowledge to complex policy problems. 19 
15 See LEWIS, supra note 13, at 27-29. Due process concerns were particularly salient 
before Congress's 1946 enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), a federal 
statute mandating that government agencies adhere to due process norms. See infra note 19 
and authorities cited therein. 
16 See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. 
L. REV. 1667, 1678 (1975). 
17 See LEWIS, supra note 13, at 27-29. 
18 17 Cong. Rec. 7290 (1886) (statement of Rep. Hitt) (debating the merits of opposing 
bills to address railway regulation). 
19 See LEWIS, supra note 13, at 3-4. Another justification for the creation of independent 
commissions is that these commissions avoid constitutional problems. See id. at 22-23. In 
particular, some members of Congress argued that the granting of regulatory power comes 
with great risk to individuals and commercial interests. See McNollgast, The Political 
Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORO. 180, 182-83 (1999). 
Designing commissions and judicializing their procedures is one way of ensuring due 
process rights for regulated interests. A related justification for the creation of independent 
agencies was lawmaker concern about the delegation of quasi-legislative power to executive 
branch actors. Before the 1946 enactment of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2000), 
independent - but not executive agencies - made use of quasi-judicial procedures when 
crafting policy. The Supreme Court favorably cited this practice in its 1935 Schechter 
Poultry decision. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 
( 1935). In explaining why Congress could not delegate power to the executive to determine 
what is and is not "fair competition," the Court distinguished this impermissibly vague 
delegation from Congress's granting of analogous power to the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC). See id. at 552. For the Court, the FTC's determination of "unfair methods of 
competition" was sensible because the FTC was a "quasi-judicial body" and "[p ]rovision 
was made for formal complaint, for notice and hearing, for appropriate findings of fact 
supported by adequate evidence, and for [Article III] judicial review to give assurance that 
the action of the commission is taken within its statutory authority." !d. at 533. With the 
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While expertise may be part of the story, authority in complex regulatory 
policy areas is also delegated to executive-branch bureaus. For example, the 
regulation of the environment (Environmental Protection Agency), the 
regulation of food and drugs (Food and Drug Administration), and the 
enforcement of antitrust laws (Department of Justice) is delegated to 
hierarchical executive-branch bureaus. Each of these areas is arguably as, or 
more, complex than the regulation of the national railroads (ICC), securities 
(Securities and Exchange Commission), and labor-management relations 
(National Labor Relations Board). What then explains the creation of 
independent commissions? 
The short answer is "political realities," for "there is [otherwise] little rhyme 
or reason as to Congress' designation of a particular agency as either a cabinet 
agency or an independent regulatory commission. "20 A burgeoning literature 
in political science backs up this conclusion,21 and while we think that 
concerns of expertise and due process are not irrelevant, there is little doubt 
that political calculations figure prominently in Congress's decision to delegate 
power to an independent, non-executive, agency. 22 Most significantly, 
members of Congress are more likely to delegate regulatory authority to 
executive branch actors when they are from the same party or when they share 
the political preferences of the President.23 When members of Congress fear 
the administrative influence of the current President on policies post-
enactment, they are more likely to create independent commissions to 
implement their policies.24 
For this very reason, the percentage of new agencies with insulating 
characteristics correlates with periods of divided government. 25 During the 
Republican Nixon and Ford administrations, for example, a Democratic 
enactment of the AP A, executive agencies are now bound by due process requirements both 
when crafting regulatory policy and when adjudicating disputes. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-
557. 
20 WILLIAM F. FOX, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 68 (3d ed. 1997). 
21 See generally DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A 
TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 
(1999); MURRAY J. HORN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: 
INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1995); LEWIS, supra note 13; Nolan 
McCarty, The Appointments Dilemma, 48 AM. J. PoL SCI . 413 (2004); Matthew D. 
McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements 
and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REv. 431 (1989); Terry M. Moe, The 
Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GoVERNMENT GoVERN? 267 (John E. Chubb 
& Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989). 
22 See Fox, supra note 20, at 68. 
23 See David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Divided Government and the Design of 
Administrative Procedures: A Formal Model and Empirical Test, 58 J. POL. 373, 387-92 
(1996). 
24 See LEWIS, supra note 13, at 27-28. 
25 See id. at 49-55. 
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Congress was especially prone to cabin presidential power through limitations 
on presidential appointment and removal authority.26 Likewise, Democratic 
Congresses sought to limit the prerogatives of the Republican Reagan and 
Bush I administrations by seeking to insulate new agencies from presidential 
controi.27 In sharp contrast, the lowest percentages of insulation were during 
the Kennedy, Johnson, and Carter administrations, when a Democratic 
Congress was largely supportive of the political objectives of these Democratic 
Presidents. 28 
A particularly good example of this phenomenon is the creation of the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC).29 In the early 1970s, 
consumer groups had successfully pressured both the President and Congress 
for a new agency.30 In 1971, President Nixon proposed a new Consumer 
Safety Administration to be located in the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare.3 1 Proponents in Congress, however, worried about Nixon's ties 
to business interests, proposed an independent regulatory structure instead.32 
The eventual CPSC was placed outside of existing bureaucratic structures and 
outfitted with a commission structure.33 To further insulate it from political 
manipulation, commissioners were granted staggered seven-year terms.34 
Democratic members of Congress were worried about the commitment of 
Richard Nixon to consumer interests, and they worried about what his 
management would mean for a new consumer agency in one of the cabinet 
departments. 35 
Of course, immediate concerns about the impact of the current President are 
not the only way politics works its way into decisions about creating 
comm1sswns. Members of Congress worry not only about the current 
President but also about the impact of future Presidents on agency policy and 
implementation. If changing presidential administrations will create dramatic 
policy change with long-term harm to social welfare, Congress will seek to 
remove regulatory policy from presidential control. The most obvious 
example of such a decision was the creation ofthe Federal Reserve in 1913.36 
Some members of Congress, and the business interests supporting them, feared 
that the short-term incentives of Presidents would be to use monetary and 
26 See id. at 49, 54. 
27 See id. at 54. 
28 See id. 
29 See Moe, supra note 21, at 289-97. 
3D See id. at 289-90. 
31 /d. at 290. 
32 See id. at 290-91. 
33 /d. at 291. 
34 /d. 
35 /d. at 290-91. 
36 See ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 146-59 
(1972). 
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banking regulation policies for political or electoral benefit to the detriment of 
long-term economic stability and investment_37 They also worried that 
electoral turnover in the White House could lead to flip-flopping monetary 
policy, from loose to tight, depending upon the party in office.38 The solution 
to this problem was to insulate monetary policy decision making, as well as 
part of banking regulation, in a Federal Reserve Board of Governors with fixed 
ten- to fourteen-year terms. 39 
For their part, Presidents typically see themselves as heads of the regulatory 
state and fight tooth and nail to resist congressional delegations to independent 
agencies.4° Consider, for example, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Initially, 
Roosevelt sought Supreme Court backing for his policy-based dismissal of 
William Humphrey, a Federal Trade Commission member.41 Humphrey sued 
for back pay and won, with the Supreme Court concluding Congress could 
statutorily limit the President's power to remove "quasi-legislative and quasi-
judicial" policymakers who disagree with presidential priorities.42 Roosevelt 
also pushed for a reorganization plan that would do away with independent 
agencies by statute.43 Through the Brownlow Committee, his Committee on 
Administrative Management, Roosevelt sought to bring the independent 
agencies "under the general supervision of Cabinet officers."44 Deeming 
37 See id. at 153-55. This was seen most clearly in their efforts to limit political influence 
on the Board of Governors and to increase banking influence on the board. See id. at 155-
58. 
38 See id. at 154-56. 
39 See id. at 153-55. The term length originally was ten years but was lengthened to 
fourteen years in 1935. Compare Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, § 10, 38 Stat. 251, 
260, with Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, § 203, 49 Stat. 684, 704. 
40 Differences between presidential and congressional sensibilities are best illustrated by 
Harry Truman's conflicting positions on the delegation of authority to regulate the nation's 
waterways to the Interstate Commerce Commission. In 1938, then-Senator Truman strongly 
backed the delegation; in 1946 President Truman opposed the delegation, arguing that 
transportation policy was too fragmented under independent-agency control. See LEWIS, 
supra note 13, at 21-22. 
41 Roosevelt sacked Humphrey, a Coolidge appointee to the Federal Trade Commission 
who supported big business and opposed the New Deal, because Roosevelt "[did] not feel 
that [Humphrey's] mind and [his] mind [went] along together." WILLIAM E. 
LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE 
AGE OF ROOSEVELT 60 (1995). For an insightful discussion of this episode (from which 
many of the claims in the balance of this paragraph are drawn), see id. at 52-81. 
42 Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935). Enraged by this and 
other anti-New Deal rulings, Roosevelt launched his failed plan to pack the Court with 
Justices sympathetic to his policy agenda. On the linkage between Humphrey's Executor 
and court-packing, see LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 41, at 79-80. 
43 See RICHARD POLENBERG, REORGANIZING ROOSEVELT'S GOVERNMENT: THE 
CONTROVERSY OVER EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION, 1936-1939, at 187-88 (1966). 
44 /d. at 25. 
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independent agencies the "headless 'fourth branch of government,"'45 the 
Brownlow Committee argued that effective presidential management of the 
administrative state required folding independent agencies into executive 
departments. 46 
And so it goes. Presidents pursue reorganization plans to expand their 
power and fight off congressional efforts to insulate government agencies from 
presidential control.47 During periods of divided government, these skirmishes 
are more intense; Congress is more likely to pursue such limits and the 
President and Congress are more apt to be at policy loggerheads.48 For 
example, responding to congressional efforts to create an independent agency 
in charge of environmental enforcement, President Nixon created the 
Environmental Protection Agency by reorganization plan in 1970.49 Presidents 
Reagan and Bush I made use of their veto power in resisting congressional 
efforts to create new repositories of independent litigating authority in the 
Merit Systems Protection Board (during the Reagan years) and the Office of 
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (during the Bush I years).50 
Needless to say, as the plethora of structural limits on presidential control of 
the administrative state makes clear, Presidents sometimes agree to statutory 
limits on their powers to administer government programs. With respect to 
45 LOUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE 148 
(4th ed. 1998). 
46 The 1938 Congress, however, had no interest in backing Roosevelt's plan: "fears and 
anxieties produced by European dictatorship[s]" translated into congressional efforts to 
cabin presidential power. POLENBERG, supra note 44, at 149. Roosevelt simply could not 
overcome the specter of a centralized totalitarian regime. See Barry D. Karl, Constitution 
and Central Planning: The Third New Deal Revisited, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 163, 188; Neal 
Devins, Government Lawyers and the New Deal, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 237, 261-65 (1996) 
(book review). 
47 Presidentially appointed commissions established to examine the administration of the 
executive branch have consistently sought to increase presidential control of the 
administrative state. For example, in justifying some proposals made in 1971 to decrease 
the number of independent agencies, the President's Advisory Council on Executive 
Organization (the Ash Council) concluded that political insulation limits the accountability 
of independent agencies to both the President and Congress. THE PRESIDENT's ADVISORY 
COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: REPORT ON 
SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES 4, 14-16 (1971). For a general overview of 
presidentially appointed management commissions, see PERl E. ARNOLD, MAKING THE 
MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY: COMPREHENSIVE REORGANIZATION PLANNING 1905-1996, at 338-
64 (2d ed., rev. 1998) (explaining the recurrent phenomenon of comprehensive executive 
reorganization planning). 
48 See discussion supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text. 
49 Reorganization Plans Nos. 3 and 4 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (Dec. 2, 1970), 
reprinted in 84 Stat. 2086 ( 1970). 
50 These two episodes are discussed in Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary 
Executive: What Makes an Independent Agency Independent?, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 273, 
279-80 (1993). 
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independent agencies, presidential disdain for inheriting an agency filled with 
commissioners appointed by the President's predecessor is counterbalanced by 
the President's desire to advance his policy goals by presiding over the 
creation of a new commission. In particular, Presidents can have a lasting 
impact on commission policy by appointing an initial slate of commissioners. 
Because of fixed and staggered terms, Presidents can lock in a particular set of 
commission policies into the next presidency more so than in an executive 
branch bureau. If the current President and a majority in Congress worry about 
losing power, creating a commission and stacking it with sympathetic 
appointees is one way of protecting policies well into the future. 
Yet the question remains: to what extent does political insulation limit 
presidential control of independent agencies? Congress sees political 
insulation as a way to limit presidential power and is especially willing to push 
for limits on the President's appointment and removal powers during periods 
of divided government. The President, too, sees political insulation as a way to 
limit presidential power. With the possible exception of the President's power 
to advance his policy agenda by presiding over the creation of a new 
independent agency, Presidents typically seek to centralize power in the White 
House. 51 This is especially true during periods of divided government, as Part 
III of this Article will make clear.52 During these periods, Presidents are 
especially concerned with agency heads breaking ranks with presidential 
priorities. 
But what if Presidents can get control of independent agencies relatively 
quickly through appointments? For example, if opposition-party 
commissioners regularly retired after a party change in the White House, the 
incoming President would be able to ensure that a majority of commissioners 
came from his party, and might even be able to appoint a majority of them. 
Likewise, if the Senate quickly rubber stamped presidential nominees to 
independent agencies, Presidents could seek out turncoat commissioners who 
would echo the President's policy preferences.53 Parts II and III will consider 
these questions. Part II will empirically evaluate the independence of the 
independent commissions, focusing primarily on the length of time it takes 
Presidents to gain control of a commission through appointments. Part III will 
evaluate those findings, focusing on the role that party polarization plays in 
shaping the respective actions of Presidents, commissioners, and Congress. 
51 ANDREW RUDALEVIGE, MANAGING THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM: PRESIDENTIAL 
LEADERSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE POLICY FORMULATION 18 (2002); Terry M. Moe, The 
Politicized Presidency, in THE NEW DIRECTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 235, 235 (John E. 
Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1985). 
52 See discussion infra Part III. 
53 As Daniel Ho puts it: "[a]necdota1 evidence abounds" that "presidents appoint [cross-
party] commissioners differing formally in partisanship but who are otherwise identical in 
viewpoint to the president." Ho, supra note 2, at 2. Ho, however, concludes that those 
studies are in error - and that cross-party appointees are particularly loyal to the party from 
which they come. See infra notes 160-65 and accompanying text. 
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II. THE DATA 
To evaluate the independence of independent commissions we collected 
data on the length of time it takes Presidents to appoint majorities to 
commissions. We used publicly available data on commissioner tenure and 
updated it through the Bush II presidency.54 Specifically, we examined the 
length of time it has taken Presidents from Warren Harding to George W. Bush 
to appoint majorities to twelve different independent regulatory commissions. 55 
We looked both at the time it takes Presidents to obtain a majority for their 
party on the commission, and the time it takes them to appoint an absolute 
majority of the commission's members. These two ways of evaluating 
commission majorities reflect two different views about how commission 
appointment politics works. If partisanship is the essence of commission 
voting, then the pivotal moment for Presidents is when they obtain a majority 
of their partisans on a commission. So, for Republican Presidents, the key 
moment is when they get a majority of Republicans on a commission, and for 
Democratic Presidents, a majority of Democrats. If, on the other hand, 
Republican Presidents appoint Democratic commissioners who vote at least 
part of the time like Republicans, and Democratic Presidents appoint 
Repubtican commissioners who vote like Democrats, then the key moment for 
the President and the commission is more likely to be when the president has 
appointed a majority of commissioners. This is a key distinction to which we 
return below. 
During this time period, Presidents were able to obtain a majority on each 
commission in all cases except one.56 On average, Presidents were able to 
obtain majorities for their party after nine or ten months. They were also able 
54 This data was collected through an NSF funded research project (SES 00-95962). 
DAVID C. NIXON, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONER DATA BASE (2005), 
http://www2.hawaii.edu/-dnixon!IRC/. The unit of analysis is the commission within a 
presidency (first term). There are ninety observations in the data. 
55 These commissions include the Atomic Energy Commission, Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission, Consumer Product Safety Commission, Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, Federal Communications Commission, Federal Election 
Commission, Federal Maritime Commission, Federal Radio Commission, Federal Trade 
Commission, National Labor Relations Board, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. 
56 We exclude the Federal Election Commission from these calculations since it has an 
even number of commissioners and by law no more than one half can be ftom the same 
political party. See 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(l) (2000). We also exclude from these calculations 
all presidents in office when a commission was created, since they were able to make all of 
the initial appointments. The case where a President was not able to appoint a majority was 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) during the Carter administration. For a 
discussion of the NRC see Carter Nominating Physicist to Nuclear Agency Vacancy, WASH. 
PosT, June 30, 1977, at 54. Had we included the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve, there would have been two more cases, the Kennedy and Nixon administrations. 
See NIXON, supra note 54. 
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to appoint an absolute majority of commissioners in most cases (ninety 
percent). Not surprisingly, most of the cases where Presidents did not appoint 
absolute majorities involved presidencies that did not last a full term (i.e., 
Harding, Kennedy, and Ford). It took individual Presidents longer on average 
- twenty-six months - to appoint an absolute majority of the members (i.e., 
three of five commissioners, or four of seven commissioners). The disparity in 
the amount of time it takes Presidents to get a party majority versus the time it 
takes to appoint an absolute majority, again, illustrates the importance of the 
members' ideology and behavior. If Republicans consistently vote like 
Republicans and Democrats consistently vote like Democrats, then the 
structure of independent commissions does not insulate as well from 
presidential control. If, however, each commissioner votes like the President 
that appointed him, then the structure insulates against new presidential 
influence much more effectively and the influence of previous Presidents lasts 
much longer into new presidential terms. 
Whether the new President is from a different party than the last President 
matters significantly for control. New Presidents from the same party as the 
prior President obtain a party majority in one to two months on average 
compared to thirteen to fourteen months for a new president from a different 
party_57 Presidents who assume office after a President from their own party 
have a built-in advantage since they frequently assume office with a majority 
of their partisans already in place on commissions. Their task is to make 
adjustments at the margins, perhaps by naming a new chair or slowly bringing 
in partisans that are more loyal to them personally. 
This is strikingly different from the task facing a President after a party 
change. Presidents who assume office after a party change confront more 
vacancies, particularly vacancies in positions formerly held by their own party. 
Figure I graphs the average number of commission vacancies by whether or 
not there has been a party change. The gray bars reflect total vacancies while 
the black bars reflect vacancies in opposition-party seats on the commission. 
As the figure suggests, there are more vacancies after a party change than 
during an intra-party transition: 0.76 vacancies per commission versus 0.39, 
which amounts to nine vacancies across the twelve commissions versus four or 
five. On their face, the data would seem to imply that new Presidents after a 
party change in the White House have the ability to reshape the commission in 
their own image and get control quickly. Interestingly, however, the additional 
vacancies exist for seats that were previously filled by commissioners from the 
President's own party. There are actually fewer vacancies in seats formerly 
held by the other party after a party change, and these are the seats that 
Presidents must fill to change majorities. Instead, the new President must 
57 Cases where presidents did not appoint majorities were coded as taking the full tenure 
of the President's term for these calculations. The overall average of nine to ten months for 
party majorities reflects the fact that about sixty percent of the cases were ones in which a 
party change had occurred in the White House. 
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immediately fill seats left open by his own party simply to ensure the party's 
influence holds its ground on the commission. The task of filling vacancies in 
slots filled by the President's own party slows down the process of getting 
majorities of the President's own partisans on the commissions. 
Figure I: Average Number of Commission Vacancies by Party Change in 
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One reason why there are more vacancies in Republican seats for 
Republican Presidents (and vice versa) after a party change in the White House 
is that Presidents leaving office usually select their own partisans for the 
appointments that will last longest into the new administration. This means 
that the staggered terms that expire first after a party change are systematically 
more likely to be from the new President's own party. A second reason for the 
surplus of vacancies in the President's own party is that opposition-party 
commissioners stay on longer. As Figure 2 shows, opposition-party 
commissioners are much more likely to stay for their full terms. Such 
commissioners probably stay longer precisely because they know that their 
departure will open the door for the other party's President to influence 
commission policies sooner. Many opposition commissioners, in fact, stay 
after their terms have expired, until a successor has been nominated and 
confirmed. 58 
58 Nowadays, commissioners generalJy are more likely to stay after their terms expire. 
For example, during the first term of the George W. Bush administration, one quarter of the 
commissioners who left had been serving longer than their stipulated terms. During 
President Eisenhower's first term, the percentage was closer to fifteen percent. From 1930 
to 1980, the average commissioner stayed for nine to seventeen months less than his term 
alJowed. From 1970 forward, the average commissioner began staying longer, so that by 
the George W. Bush administration the average commissioner stayed only two months less 
than his term allowed and more stayed longer. 
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Figure 2: Tenure of Commissioners After a Party Change in White House 
by Party of Commissioner 










Opposition Party President's Party 
Looking just at averages across this long time period masks consequential 
changes in presidential commission politics over time. Importantly, it is now 
taking Presidents longer and longer to appoint majorities.59 While there is 
variation from President to President (largely explained by whether there has 
been a party change in the White House), there appears to be an increasing 
trend. 6° Figure 3 graphs the average time it took Presidents to obtain a 
majority of their partisans on the commissions in this study. The length of 
time fluctuates substantially but shows an increase, particularly in recent years. 
For example, it took an average of twenty months for Presidents Clinton and 
George W. Bush to obtain Democratic and Republican majorities, respectively, 
on the independent regulatory commissions (IRC) - which is longer than the 
average. It also took them slightly longer to appoint absolute majorities (by 
59 See infra p. 473 fig.3. 
60 One of the puzzling aspects of this picture is the relatively short time it took President 
Reagan to get party majorities on commissions at the same time that confirmation delays 
were increasing. The puzzle has two explanations. First, the apparent confirmation delay 
was driven by slow action on holdover commissioners - that is, the people he was 
renominating took longer to get confirmed. So, they were already on the commissions, and 
the confirmation delay did not matter for getting control of the commissions. To illustrate, 
his first five new nominations were confirmed less than one month after nomination (SEC, 
FCC, NRC, FCC, NRC). Four of these were Republican nominations, the longest delay for 
a non-holdover nomination being less than three months. By contrast, the average delay for 
a holdover was over four months. The Republican Senate was pretty good about moving 
Reagan's new nominees through. Second, Reagan also made six recess appointments in his 
first year, five Republicans and one Democrat (NLRB, FEC, EEOC). Confirmation delay 
is, obviously, not a problem if nominees obtain recess appointments. 
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approximately one month). Both of these averages are also higher than those 
of their immediate predecessors. 
Figure 3: Average Time to Get a Partisan Majority on IRCs 
President 
One reason for the increased delay is that it is taking longer for Presidents to 
get commissioners confirmed. For example, at the end of 2007, none of the 
commissioners on the Federal Election Commission had been confirmed for a 
regular term.61 Three were serving under recess appointments, two others were 
serving in expired terms, and a sixth slot was vacant. The difficulty stemmed 
from partisan disagreements between Republicans and Democrats in the Senate 
over a package of appointees to be brought up for a vote.62 Democratic 
objections to one of the Republican nominees, Hans von Spakovsky, led to 
four different holds being placed on the nominee in the Senate.63 Republicans 
opposed bringing the other nominees to the floor without von Spakovsky, 
leading to a stalernate.64 This squabble threatened to leave the FEC without a 
quorum when the congressional session ended in December since those 
61 See Matthew Mosk, Senate Battle Over FEC Nominee May Hamper Agency's Ability 
to Act, WASH. Posr, October 26,2007, at Al9. The Consumer Product Safety Commission 
has been hampered by a similar dispute. In May 2007, President George W. Bush's 
nominee for chair, Michael Baroody, withdrew his nomination when it became apparent he 
would not receive confirmation. No subsequent nominee was put forward for the position, 
leaving the position on the three-person board vacant. As a result, the agency has not been 
able to issue new rules or judgments. See Pete Yost, Consumer Commission Nominee 
Withdraws, WASH. POST, May 23, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007 /05/23/ AR2007052300897 .html. 
62 Mosk, supra note 61. On the Senate's increasing "hatching" of Republican and 
Democratic nominees, see infra notes 140-47 and accompanying text. 
63 Mosk, supra note 61. 
64 Id. 
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commissioners serving under recess appointments would be required to leave 
at the end of the congressional session.65 
The FEC case is one example of how increasingly polarized parties have a 
harder time coming to agreement over nominees.66 Figure 4 graphs the 
average delay between commissioner nomination and confirmation. The data 
reveal a noticeable increase in confirmation delay over time, particularly 
recently. Starting in the mid-l970s, there has been a noticeable increase in the 
time between when a nomination was sent to the Senate and when the 
nomination was confirmed. This helps explain the increase in time it takes 
Presidents to appoint majorities. 
"' .c E 
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This figure likely underestimates the true effect of confirmation delay, since 
it does not account for delays in making nominations in the first place. If 
Presidents anticipate difficulties in the Senate, time spent vetting potential 
nominees increases, as does the amount of legwork and preparation necessary 
before a nomination is formally made- i.e., an increase in confirmation delay 
also increases nomination delay. 67 Indeed, during periods of divided 
65 !d. 
66 ln Part III, we examine how party polarization impacts the appointment and 
confirmation of commissioners. In so doing, we highlight how opposition-party senators 
make use of holds to advance their party's agenda. See infra text accompanying note 133-
34. 
67 Another reason the figure likely underestimates the true amount of delay is that the 
data do not include commissioners who were nominated but never confirmed. Nominees 
that were rejected outright or delayed to the end of a session experience the longest 
confirmation delays. If rejections or withdrawals are more likely to happen as time goes on, 
then looking at just those cases where nominees were confirmed underestimates the true 
effect of confirmation delay. 
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government, Congress has a weaker incentive to act on presidential nominees 
in a timely manner, particularly if the term-expired commissioner shares the 
ideology or partisanship of the congressional majority. 
As the FEC case suggests, it is also harder for parties within the Senate to 
come to agreement about proposed commissioners.68 As a result, the 
nomination and confirmation process has gotten longer on both sides as 
Presidents have taken longer to vet potential nominees and Congress has been 
slower confirming nominations. As Figure 5 demonstrates, Presidents who 
take office during periods of divided government confront about half as many 
vacant commissioner slots.69 During periods of divided government, 
commissioners serve longer, arguably because they are more uncertain about 
the outcome of future appointments and because more is at stake in 
disagreements on the commission. The willingness of current FEC 
commissioners to stay longer than their current terms is likely related to 
appointment difficulties created by the disagreement between the Senate and 
White House over von Spakovsky's nomination, and more generally by the 
disagreements between the parties within the Senate chamber. 70 The aggregate 
effect of party polarization is that Presidents have not been able to control 
commissions as effectively as they have in the past. 
68 Studies of judicial and executive branch appointments likewise underscore that part of 
the confirmation delay is due to increasing political polarization. See Sarah A. Binder & 
Forrest Maltzman, Senatorial Delay in Confirming Federal Judges, 1947-1998, 46 AM. J. 
PoL. Sci. 190, 197 (2002); Nolan McCarty & Rose Razaghian, Advice and Consent: Senate 
Responses to Executive Branch Nominations 1885-1996, 43 AM. J. PoL. SCI. 1122, 1141 
(1999); David C. Nixon & David L. Goss, Confirmation Delay for Vacancies on the Circuit 
Courts of Appeals, 29 AM. PoL. RES. 246,247 (2001). 
69 See infra p. 476 fig.S. 
70 See Mosk, supra note 61. 
HeinOnline -- 88 B.U. L. Rev.  476 2008
476 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:459 
















Unified Government Divided Government 
• Total Vacancies • Opposition Party Vacancies 
This issue of political polarization is central to our argument; so it is worth 
reviewing what social scientists know about this phenomenon. In Figure 6, we 
reproduce a figure from political scientist Keith Poole's website on political 
polarization.71 It graphs the ideological similarity of the Democratic and 
Republican parties using a numerical measure of ideology produced by Poole 
and his colleague, Howard Rosenthal.72 This measure uses legislative voting 
behavior on different bills by different legislators over time to estimate the 
liberalism and conservatism of each member numerically. 73 The figure graphs 
the difference between the average liberal or conservative (what they term D-
NOMINA TE) scores for each party in the House and Senate. Higher values on 
this graph imply more polarization since the difference in the parties is greater. 
71 NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T . POOLE, & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA: 
THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES (2006), available at 
http://polarizedamerica.com/; see also Sean M. Theriault, Party Polarization in Congress 
(April 25, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://web.austin.utexas.edu/seant/ 
party_polarization.pdf. 
72 KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY 
OF ROLL CALL VOTING 233 (1997). 
73 See id. 
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The figure shows that party polarization has fluctuated over time. Notably, 
there was a large difference between the parties in the late nineteenth century, 
but this difference narrowed by the middle of the twentieth century. Since that 
point, however, polarization has been increasing - and most dramatically so 
since the late 1970s. Not only has the average Republican become more 
conservative and the average Democrat more liberal, but the divergence of 
views within the parties has also lessened. The increased polarization of the 
two parties has dramatic consequences for a number of aspects of American 
political life, including presidential appointments. As we argue in Part III, 
party polarization influences not only the politics of selection, nomination, and 
confirmation of appointees, but also the types of persons selected for 
commissions and their behavior once at work in these agencies. 
III. EXPLAINING THE DATA: PARTY POLARIZATION, COMMISSIONER 
TURNOVER, AND THE APPOINTMENT OF PARTY LOYALISTS 
In making sense of the data we have assembled, the last picture - showing 
the dramatic rise of political polarization - is most telling. As we will now 
explain, we think that political polarization has figured prominently both in 
presidential efforts to gain control of independent agencies and in efforts by 
the opposition party in Congress to limit presidential control. In particular, 
polarization contributes to White House efforts to coordinate independent-
agency policy making through the appointment of like-minded commissioners; 
correspondingly, the opposition party in Congress is more likely to use holds 
and other confirmation-delaying strategies to resist these presidential efforts 
and to advance its competing policy agenda. Likewise, we think that the 
increasing propensity of opposition-party commissioners to serve out all or 
nearly all of their terms is tied to political polarization. Finally, for reasons we 
will soon detail, we think the so-called Reagan Revolution figures prominently 
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in this story of presidential appointments, congressional confirmation, and 
commissioner turnover. Reagan reshaped the presidency by placing greater 
emphasis on ideology in appointing agency heads, emphasizing the President's 
power of unilateral action when pursuing policy initiatives, and reshaping the 
Republican party in ways that increased the ideological gap between 
Democrats and Republicans. 
To start, a few words about political polarization and its impact on 
presidential administration: 74 "The polarization between the legislative parties 
is, perhaps, one of the most obvious and recognizable trends in Congress 
during the last thirty years."75 The political forces that once pushed Democrats 
and Republicans towards the center have dissipated. In the South, conservative 
"Southern Democrats" have been displaced- both by Republicans who now 
occupy conservative seats and by liberal Democrats who occupy the remaining 
Democratic seats.76 Likewise, the liberal "Rockefeller Republican" has been 
pushed out; the ascendancy of "Ronald Reagan's GOP" in 1980 was linked to 
the defeat of the moderate-to-liberal wing of the Republican party. 77 
Measures of ideology reveal that the "two parties are perfectly separated": 
the most liberal Republican in Congress is more conservative than the most 
conservative Democrat.78 With no meaningful ideological range within either 
the Democratic or Republican Party, longstanding gaps between Northern and 
Southern lawmakers of the two parties have largely disappeared. 79 Thus, when 
legislation is enacted, party cohesion results in a shift in power to party leaders 
who "see the lawmaking process as a way to stand behind a unified party 
74 The points made in the following two paragraphs are largely drawn from Neal Devins, 
Essay, The Academic Expert Before Congress: Observations and Lessons from Bill Van 
Alstyne's Testimony, 54 DUKE L.J. 1525, 1534-39 (2005). That essay looks at the ways that 
political polarization has transformed congressional hearings into a mechanism for parties to 
advance their pre-existing political agendas. 
75 Sean M. Theriault, The Case of the Vanishing Moderate: Party Polarization in the 
Modem Congress 5 (May 2, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www .Ia. utexas.edu/-seant/vanishing. pdf. 
76 See Jason M. Roberts & Steven S. Smith, Procedural Contexts, Party Strategy, and 
Conditional Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1971-2000, 47 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 305, 306 (2003). 
77 See, e.g., Kate O'Beime, Rockefeller Republicans Take Manhattan, NAT'L REv. 
ONLINE, July 7, 2004, http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NDJiODgzMWQ5NzBhN2 
Nm YTY I Y2Y 4MDUyMDY2NDczZmQ=. 
78 108th House Rank Ordering, http://voteview.com/houl08.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 
2008); see also 109th House Rank Ordering, http://voteview.com/hou109.htrn (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2008). 
79 Cf Roberts & Smith, supra note 76, at 306. During the Civil Rights era of the 1960s, 
of course, there was a sharp North-South (as opposed to Democrat-Republican) divide in 
Congress. 
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message and, in this way, distinguish their party from the other."80 Rather than 
allowing decentralized committees to define Congress's agenda, lawmakers are 
more apt to see themselves as members of a party, not as independent power 
brokers.81 For all these reasons, the separation of powers between Congress 
and the White House has given way to the "separation of parties."82 
Lawmakers advance party interests, not Congress's institutional interests, such 
that relations between Congress and the White House are defined by whether 
there is unified or divided government.83 
One of the sources of political polarization in Congress is the so-called 
Reagan Revolution. Rather than govern from the center, Reagan sought to 
transform the Republican Party. By lowering taxes, devolving power towards 
the states, and introducing other initiatives intended to reduce people's reliance 
on the federal government, Reagan drove a wedge between moderate and 
conservative Republicans (and between Republicans and Democrats). As 
leader of "[t]he most ideological administration in recent history," Reagan 
openly embraced social and religious conservatives.84 For example, when 
running for President in 1980 and 1984, Reagan both pledged to appoint judges 
who "share our commitment to judicial restraint" and reached out to social 
conservatives by condemning Supreme Court decisions on school prayer, 
busing, and - especially - abortion. 85 
Equally significant, Reagan sought to revolutionize the presidency. Legal 
theorists in the Justice Department and elsewhere spoke about the "unitary 
executive" and, with it, the need for presidential control of all governmental 
agencies.86 Before the Supreme Court, for example, the administration argued 
(unsuccessfully) that "there must be a unitary, vigorous, and independent 
Executive who is responsible directly to the people, not to Congress (except by 
80 Devins, supra note 74, at 1538; see also C. Lawrence Evans, Committees, Leaders, 
and Message, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 217 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. 
Oppenheimer eds., 7th ed. 2000). 
81 See Devins, supra note 74, at 1539. 
82 For a fuller treatment of this topic, see generally Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. 
Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REv. 2311 (2006). 
83 See id. at 2315. 
84 Chester E. Finn, Jr., Affirmative Action Under Reagan, COMMENT., Apr. 1982, at 17, 
28. 
85 1984 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM, reprinted in 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 41-B, 55-B 
to 56-B ( 1984). In particular, Reagan called for the overruling of Engel v. Vitale and Roe v. 
Wade- saying that "God should [never] have been expelled from the classroom," and that 
Roe was as divisive and wrong as Dred Scott. Ronald Reagan Remarks and a Question-and-
Answer Session with the Student Body of Providence-St. Mel High School in Chicago, 
Illinios, 1 PUB. PAPERS 603 (May 10, 1982). 
86 For insider accounts, see CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW, ARGUING THE REAGAN 
REVOLUTION- A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 132-71 ( 1991 ); DOUGLAS W. KMIEC, THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL'S LAWYER: INSIDE THE MEESE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 48~65 (1992). 
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impeachment)"87 and that "developments since Humphrey's Executor .. . have 
cast a shadow over [independent agencies]."88 
The administration also sought to centralize power in the presidency through 
initiatives on signing statements and regulatory review.89 Signing statements 
were seen as a way to combat congressional efforts to limit presidential control 
of the administrative state by leaving it to agencies (and their congressional 
overseers) to fill in the details of vague statutory language.90 Reagan's 
regulatory review initiative, expressed in Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498, 
were more consequential.91 Executive Order 12,291 required all executive 
agencies to submit proposed policies or rules to the Office of Management and 
Budget.92 Executive Order 12,498 required executive agencies to submit their 
proposed regulatory agenda and to explain how their agenda advanced the 
President's objectives on an annual basis.93 Through these orders, "the 
president and his principal aides [were empowered] to exercise a much greater 
degree of influence over executive branch regulation than had existed 
previously. "94 
87 Brief for the United States at 33, Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1985) (Nos. 85-
1377,85-1378, and 85-1379). 
88 /d. at 81 n.32. On the question of independent agencies, the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
and expanded Humphrey's. Bowsherv. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,724-27 (1985). In Bowsher v. 
Synar, the Court - while invalidating the Gramm-Rudman statute - self-consciously 
reaffirmed the legality of independent agencies. /d. at 734-36. For an insightful account of 
internal deliberations in the case, see Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases During 
/986, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 117, 117 (1987). In Morrison v. Olson, the Court affirmed the 
power of Congress to restrict presidential removal of an independent counsel exercising 
purely executive powers. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 688-93 (1987); see also id. at 
724-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (lamenting that the Court's decision goes far beyond the 
limits recognized in Humphrey's ). 
89 See KMIEC, supra note 86, at 48-57. 
90 According to Doug Kmiec, one of the architects of Reagan's signing statement 
initiative, the "signing statement was 'crucial for the administration to give the executive 
branch direction top-down on inevitable interpretation."' Christopher S. Kelley & Bryan W. 
Marshall, The Last Mover Advantage: Presidential Power and the Role of Signing 
Statements 6 (April 20, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with All Academic 
Research), available at http://www.allacademic.com/metalp 13973 7 _index.html (quoting 
Interview by Christopher S. Kelley with Douglas W. Kmiec, via E-mail (Apr. 23, 2001)); 
see also KMIEC, supra note 86, at 52-53. 
91 See Christopher S. Kelley, A Matter of Direction: The Reagan Administration, the 
Signing Statement, and the 1986 West/aw Decision, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 283, 290 
(2007). 
92 Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3(c), 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981). 
93 Exec. Order No. 12,498 § l(a), (b), 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985). 
94 GEORGE C. EADS & MICHAEL FIX, RELIEF OR REFORM? REAGAN'S REGULATORY 
DILEMMA 117 ( 1984 ). As one defender of these programs put it: "OMB was to be the 
President's eyes and ears in the regulatory field. . . . [Its] job was to ensure that individual 
actions taken by federal agencies were well reasoned, economically sound and coordinated 
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A third way Reagan sought to coordinate policymaking was through the 
appointment of agency heads who shared his deregulatory agenda. Other 
Presidents, of course, had paid attention to political patronage and ideological 
compatibility when making appointments.95 But prior administrations had less 
assiduously sought loyalty and ideological compatibility. 96 Reagan 
emphasized the need for appointees to see themselves as part of a unitary 
administration and not as a manager of some discrete agency.97 In particular, 
unlike Carter and Ford, who had made subject-matter expertise the hallmark of 
their regulatory appointments, Reagan vetted nominees for "ideological 
consistency and intensity."98 According to Donald Devine, Reagan's Director 
of Office of Personnel Management (OPM), "[a] few months after taking 
office, [Reagan] instructed [OPM] that political and philosophical loyalty 
should be primary considerations in making appointments."99 
with the policies of other agencies." KMIEC, supra note 86, at 48. For similar statements by 
Reagan administration officials, see Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White 
House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1080-82 (1986); see also 
TERRY EASTLAND, ENERGY IN THE EXECUTIVE: THE CASE FOR THE STRONG PRESIDENCY 163-
64 ( 1992). For critical assessments of the Reagan initiative, see generally Alan B. Morrison, 
Commentary, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a 
Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1986); Morton Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of 
Executive Power: Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 
I2,291, 80 MICH. L. REV. 193 (1981). 
95 For example, during the Eisenhower administration, the President was routinely 
accused of "perverting" federal regulatory agencies and "stacking" regulatory boards with 
Republican partisans. See Business Control of Agencies Seen, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1955, at 
15; Ike Seen "Stacking" U.S. Boards, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1955, at 2; see also DAVID E. 
LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS: POLITICAL CONTROL AND 
BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE 11, 32-33, 40-41 (2008). See generally Terry M. Moe, 
Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. 197 (1982) 
(demonstrating "gradual, partisan-directed presidential impact" in independent-agency 
decision making from 1947-1977). 
96 See EADS & FIX, supra note 94, at 141-42; see also RICHARD P. NATHAN, THE PLOT 
THAT FAILED: NIXON AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY 39-40 (1975) ("[Officials] were 
closeted for long hours in orientation sessions with career program officials, the purpose 
being for these career officials to explain to them program goals and accomplishments."). 
97 See EADS & FIX, supra note 94, at 140-46; Steven D. Stehr, Top Bureaucrats and the 
Distribution of Influence in Reagan's Executive Branch, 57 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 75, 78 
(1997). 
98 Dick Kirschten, Team Players, NAT'L J., Feb. 19, 1983, at 385 (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also EADS & FIX, supra note 94, at 141 (describing the "unusually 
uniform probusiness and antiregulation image" of Reagan nominees). 
99 DONALD J. DEVINE, REAGAN'S TERRIBLE SWIFT SWORD: REFORMING AND 
CONTROLLING THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 8-9 (1991). After determining whether a 
candidate was "commit[ted] to Reagan's objectives," the vetting process took into account 
"integrity, competence, teamwork, ... toughness, [and] ... commitment to change." 
EASTLAND, supra note 94, at 150 (internal quotation marks omitted). Another commentator 
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Reagan's pursuit of the "unitary executive" through appointments, judicial 
filings, and regulatory review was a sea change. Perhaps for this reason, 
Reagan's regulatory initiatives were resisted by Democrats in Congress. 100 
"[A]n all-out assault" was launched in Congress; the law was changed to 
require Senate confirmation of the OMB director and there were threats to 
defunct OMB review of regulation. 101 With respect to OMB review of 
independent agencies, Reagan avoided a fight with Congress, limiting OMB 
review to executive agencies. 102 This decision was based on both political and 
legal considerations. Legally, the Justice Department cautioned the President 
about "the novelty and complexity of the question."103 Politically, the OMB 
was in the middle of the battle over tax cuts and their related defense of 
supply-side economics. 104 Rather than spend political capital only to have the 
courts reaffirm and extend Humphrey's Executor, the administration took what 
they could get from regulatory control: making use of appointments and 
judicial filings to gain control of independent agencies. 105 
In looking back at Reagan's regulatory revolution, the most striking feature 
of Reagan's OMB and appointments initiatives is their permanence. 106 
similarly concluded that the Reagan administration sought to determine whether a candidate 
was a Reagan supporter, a Republican, a conservative, and a believer in Reagan's view of 
government. See Chester A. Newland, A Mid-Term Appraisal- The Reagan Presidency: 
Limited Government and Political Administration, 43 PUB. ADMIN. REv. I, 3 (1983). 
Correspondingly, because Reagan was more distrustful of the federal bureaucracy than 
perhaps any previous President, Reagan regularly appointed agency heads "with 
surprisingly little experience in the technical fields regulated by their agencies or offices." 
EADS & FIX, supra note 94, at 145; see also James P. Pfiffner, Political Appointees and 
Career Executives: The Democracy-Bureaucracy Nexus in the Third Century, 47 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. 57, 58 (1987). 
100 See KMIEC, supra note 86, at 47-65. 
101 !d. at 49. 
102 See KMIEC, supra note 86, at 58. 
103 Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REv. I, 28 (1995) (observing that the Justice Department thought both that the President had 
legal authority to extend OMB review and that the President might nevertheless lose in 
court). 
104 In his memoir, OMB director David Stockman makes only one mention of OMB 
regulatory review, focusing almost exclusively on tax and spending cuts. See DAVID A. 
STOCKMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF POLITICS: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE REAGAN REVOLUTION 112-
13 (1987). 
105 See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text (discussing judicial filings) . On 
Reagan's staffing of independent agencies, see EADS & FIX, supra note 94, at 140-48 
(discussing the role of appointments in the Reagan Revolution); Neal Devins, Congress, the 
FCC, and the Search for the Public Trustee, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 145, 145-50 
(1993) (discussing Reagan appointees to the FCC). 
106 After Supreme Court rulings reaffirming independent agencies and upholding the 
independent-counsel statute, the Justice Department has largely steered clear oflegal battles 
over the legitimacy of independent agencies. See KMIEC, supra note 86, at 58-60. The one 
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Ideological loyalty has become a hallmark of presidential appointments. 
Consider, for example, Bill Clinton: "[T]he one constant in Clinton's 
appointments (including to federal judgeships) was relatively strong 
confidence in the nominee's fidelity to the president's agenda."107 Indeed, 
even Clinton's campaign pledge to pay greater attention to racial and gender 
diversity in his appointments was interpreted as an effort to appoint political 
liberals, with "some senators and interest groups view[ing] ethnicity and 
notable exception is a dispute between the Bush I administration and the U.S. Postal Service 
over the Postal Service's power to independently litigate postal rate disputes. After Bush I 
had lost the 1992 election to Bill Clinton, the President - at the urging of White House 
counsel Boyden Gray- demanded the Postal Service kick such disputes over to the Justice 
Department. The Postal Service refused, successfully defending their prerogatives in court. 
For a discussion of this dispute, see generally Neal Devins, Tempest in an Envelope: 
Reflections on the Bush White House's Failed Takeover of the U.S. Postal Service, 41 
UCLA L. REv. 1035 (1994). For additional discussion, see infra notes 135-38 and 
accompanying text 
107 MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 131 (2000). A study by Joan Flynn of presidential appointees to 
the NLRB, however, argues that Clinton (as well as Bush I) departed from Reagan 
administration efforts to push an ideological agenda through their independent-agency 
appointments. See Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board: The Transformation 
of the NLRB, 1935-2000, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1392-98 (2000). According to this study, 
Bush and Clinton both nominated "moderates" to the NLRB, individuals who "would have 
been routinely confirmed under the 'old rules."' !d. at 1427. But the National Right to 
Work Committee (backed by Jesse Helms and other senatorial allies) pressured both Clinton 
and Bush to make more ideological choices. /d. at 1425-28. In this and other ways, Flynn 
concludes the Senate seized control of the NLRB. In our view, Flynn's study is useful - but 
we draw somewhat different conclusions from the same data. To start, we agree with Flynn 
that the confirmation process is more politicized and, as such, the Senate is pushing the 
President to nominate more ideological nominees. See supra notes 93-100 and 
accompanying text. Unlike Flynn, however, we think that Presidents typically agree with 
party leaders from their party- so that same-party nominees are likely to reflect presidential 
preferences. See infra notes 112-18 and accompanying text. The fact that a Republican 
senator put a hold on a Bush I nomination cuts against, but does not undermine, this claim. 
Helms may have taken a position more extreme than most in his party and, in any event, 
Bush I was able to appoint commissioners compatible both to his agenda and the agenda of 
Senate Republicans. Senate Confirms New Heads of OSHA and MSHA; Late Vote on Two 
DOL, Four NLRB Posts Possible, 1989 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 194, at A-4 (Oct. 10, 
1989). Cross-party nominees, in contrast, are likely to reflect opposition-party preferences. 
See infra notes 160-65 and accompanying text. For this very reason, as Flynn meticulously 
details, NLRB appointees are likely to be packaged - so that Presidents will name more than 
one commissioner at a time, some Democrat and some Republican. See Flynn, supra, at 
1429-32. This practice of "hatching" nominations has become more and more common-
and it speaks to the ways party polarization has transformed the dance that takes place 
between the President and Senate over the appointment and confirmation of independent 
agency heads. See infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text. 
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gender to some extent as rough proxies of nominees' ideology."108 Clinton's 
nominees for cabinet posts "were likewise told, 'These positions are Bill 
Clinton's and he appoints them - the Senate-confirmed positions, the 
noncareer SES positions, and the Schedule C positions -he selects them. '"109 
The continuing salience of OMB review is even more striking. Jim 
Blumstein, nominated in 1990 to head the OMB regulatory-review process, put 
it this way: "After [decades] of political and intellectual Strum und Orang on 
the issue of centralized presidential regulatory review ... it appears that we are 
all (or nearly all) Unitarians now."110 Blumstein, writing at the start of the 
Bush II administration, was referring to the fact that presidential oversight of 
the regulatory process had "become a permanent part of the institutional design 
of American govemment."111 Elena Kagan, a senior member of Clinton's 
domestic policy staff, boasted that "presidential control of administration, in 
critical respects, expanded dramatically during the Clinton years, making the 
regulatory activity of the executive branch agencies more and more an 
extension of the President's own policy and political agenda."112 Not only did 
Clinton strengthen Reagan-era executive orders, 113 he also made extensive use 
of pre-enforcement policy directives to ensure executive agencies followed 
presidential understandings when enforcing recently enacted statutes. 114 For 
its part, the Bush II administration further extended regulatory review 
108 GERHARDT, supra note 107, at 131. 
109 LEWIS, supra note 95, at 24 (quoting Telephone Interview by David E. Lewis with 
Emily Sheketoff, (Sept. 29, 2006)). 
110 James F. Blumstein, Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the President: An 
·Overview and Policy Analysis of Current Issues, 51 DuKE L.J. 851, 851-52 (2001). 
111 i>ildes & Sunstein, supra note 103, at 15. 
112 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2245, 2248 (2001). 
113 Executive Order 12,866 made explicit what had been implicit in Reagan-era executive 
orders, namely, that "centralized presidential regulatory review is aimed at making agency 
regulations 'consistent with ... the President's priorities."' Blumstein, supra note 110, at 
853 (quoting Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 2(b), 3 C.P.R. 638, 640 (1994), reprinted in 5 
U.S.C. § 601 (2000)). With respect to independent agencies, the Clinton order required 
threm to submit "[a] statement of the agency's regulatory objectives and priorities and how 
they relate to the President's priorities." Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 4(c)(A), 3 C.P.R. 638, 
642 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000). This demand was symbolically significant 
but, ultimately, without teeth - making it minimal in its scope and representing the least 
difficult legal path. See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 103, at 32-33. That Clinton pushed 
the envelope further speaks both to the growing acceptance of OMB review in Congress and 
among the regulated community. It also speaks to the fact that Clinton (at the time of the 
Executive Order) presided over a unified government and, as such, was not likely to be 
subject to congressional reprimand. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 82, at 2327 
(discussing the growing importance of party identity in Congress-White House relations). 
114 See Kagan, supra note 112, at 2293-96. 
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Executive Orders, and has also sought aggressively to centralize government 
power in a unitary executive. liS 
The persistence of Reagan's embrace of centralization, unitariness, and 
ideological compatibility demonstrates two phenomena. First, Reagan's 
initiatives strengthened the presidency. "In moving ambitiously down the 
paths of politicization and centralization, [Reagan] built a set of administrative 
arrangements that by past standards proved coherent, well integrated, and 
eminently workable." 116 Consequently, future Presidents presumably would 
"have every reason to learn from and build upon the Reagan example in 
seeking to enhance their own institutional capacities for leadership. "117 
Second, for reasons we will now detail, Reagan's regulatory initiatives make 
more sense today than ever before. When the parties are polarized and the 
White House and Congress are divided, Presidents have strong incentives to 
pursue unilateral policymaking through loyal appointees. 118 
Party polarization and divided government both push the locus of 
government authority away from Congress and toward government agencies, 
"such that executive and administrative agency action has displaced 
lawmaking as the principal source ofpolicymaking."119 Given the increasingly 
divergent ideological agendas of Democrats and Republicans, it becomes more 
difficult for Congress and the White House to agree on significant legislation, 
especially in times of divided government. 120 Furthermore, even when 
115 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 18, 2007) (amending Exec. 
Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994)). For a general (and highly critical) treatment of this 
subject, see generally CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL 
PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2007). For a more positive 
view of the Bush II administration, see Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential 
Signing Statements and Executive Power 32-51 (Univ. Chi. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 121, 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=922400 (arguing that President George 
W. Bush's signing statements do not threaten the separation of powers and may be a helpful 
aid in statutory interpretation). 
116 Moe, supra note 51, at 271. 
117 /d. Some scholars also suggest that "[ o ]nee an area of administration has been 
politicized it is virtually impossible to reverse the process." Pfiffner, supra note 99, at 59. 
118 When Reagan assumed office, the parties were not especially polarized. See supra 
notes 74-85 and accompanying text. In other words, Reagan's initiatives foreshadowed 
today's era of party polarization. For reasons previously detailed, Reagan's efforts to 
transform the Republican Party anticipated a sharp ideological divide between Democrats 
and Republicans. See supra p. 4 77 fig.6. 
119 Neal Devins, Signing Statements and Divided Government, 16 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 63, 71 (2007); see also Kagan, supra note 112, at 2248-50. 
120 Devins, supra note 119, at 71. Indeed, the combination of party polarization and 
supermajority requirements in the Senate limits Congress's ability to enact significant 
legislation during periods of unified government if the minority party has at least forty 
members in the Senate. But see DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY 
CONTROL, LAWMAKJNG, AND lNVESTIGA TIONS, 1946-2002, at 76 (2d ed. 2005). 
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Congress enacts legislation, "ideological divergence between Democrats and 
Republicans makes it likely that the President and Congress will have 
competing spins on legislative meaning."121 
Divided government, relatively unusual before 1955, has become the norm 
over the past fifty years. 122 By the end of the Bush II Administration in 2009, 
different parties will have controlled the White House and at least one house of 
Congress for thirty of the last forty years. 123 With the dramatic rise of political 
polarization since the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan, Presidents invariably 
pursue policy initiatives through executive orders, directives, and other 
unilateral acts.l 24 Consider, for example, Bill Clinton's health care reforms 
and George W. Bush's faith-based initiatives. In both instances, Congress 
refused to enact legislation backing the President, and in both instances, Bush 
and Clinton advanced their policy priorities through unilateral action. 125 
For its part, Congress rarely seeks to overturn unilateral, presidential 
action. 126 Congress attempted to overturn only thirty-seven of approximately 
1,000 executive orders issued from 1973 to 1998. Of the thirty-seven 
congressional bills challenging executive action, only three became law. 127 
Rather than confronting unilateral executive actions directly, the opposition 
party in Congress instead seeks to wield influence by using its confirmation 
and oversight powers to push agt;ncy heads away from presidential priorities 
and toward competing congressional priorities. 128 During periods of divided 
government, the opposition party can use its oversight powers to hold hearings, 
demand that agency heads tum over information, and otherwise attempt to 
block executive policy making. 129 Perhaps more importantly, the opposition 
121 Devins, supra note 119, at 72. 
122 Levinson & Pildes, supra note 82, at 2330-31. 
123 Before the 2000 presidential election, government was unified for only six of the prior 
thirty-two years (twenty percent of the time). !d. During the Bush II years, Democrats 
controlled the Senate from 2001-2002 and both houses from 2007-2008. 
124 See WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DIRECT 
PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 6 (2003); Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, Unilateral Action and 
Presidential Power: A Theory, 29 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 850, 851 ( 1999). 
125 See Devins, supra note 119, at 67; William G. Howell, Unilateral Powers: A Brief 
Overview, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 417, 418 (2005). 
126 Devins, supra note 120, at 67. 
127 Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 
J.L. ECON. & 0RG. 132, 165-66 (1999); see HOWELL, supra note 124, at 121 ("The 
president's powers of unilateral action are greatest when they do not require Congress to 
take any subsequent action, something not easily done given the vast transaction costs and 
collective action problems that plague the institution."). 
128 Devins, supra note 119, at 65. 
129 During periods of unified government, when the President's party controls oversight, 
oversight takes a back seat to party loyalty. Specifically, party polarization typically results 
in comparatively lax oversight - both because there is a greater commitment to party unity 
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party can use its confirmation power to push the President to nominate agency 
heads whom its members find acceptable. 130 In particular, by placing holds on 
presidential nominees, the opposition party can block votes on presidential 
appointments unless sixty senators vote to break the hold. 
Increasing political polarization in Congress has complicated the 
confirmation politics dynamic in three ways. First, the stakes are higher. 
Political polarization has shifted the focus of government policymaking away 
from Congress and to government agencies. Second, the ideological gap 
between Democrats and Republicans makes it harder for the President and his 
opponents in Congress to agree on a consensus nominee. Third, the President 
and his Senate opponents use the appointments and confirmation process more 
strategically to advance their respective agendas. Presidents place greater 
emphasis on ideological conformity in their nominees; the opposition party in 
the Senate increasingly uses its confirmation power to stave off presidential 
unilateralism and otherwise push its agenda. 
Against this backdrop, it is little wonder that the dance that takes place 
between Congress and the White House on confirmation politics has become 
so intricate and explosive. 131 Once a process of conflict avoidance and 
resolution, "the confirmation process has become conflict seeking rather than 
conflict avoiding, conflict magnifying rather than conflict minimizing; and the 
root of nearly all appointment conflict is public policy."132 The advent of party 
polarization, something that began immediately before Ronald Reagan 
assumed office, marked a dramatic shift in Senate procedures. Starting at that 
time, senators "began to hold longer hearings, increasingly used strategic holds 
on nominations for political leverage, and increasingly scrutinized 
nominees."133 "Nominees," as an official of both Bush administrations put it, 
"are now treated like pieces of legislation, facing the full array of 
and because the majority in Congress is more likely to agree with the President's policy 
priorities. Devins, supra note 119, at 74-76; Levinson & Pildes, supra note 82, at 2344-46. 
130 See Devins, supra note 119, at 70. 
131 The 2005 fight over Democratic filibusters of Bush II judicial nominees exemplifies 
this struggle. The Republican-controlled Senate was on the verge of approving the so-called 
"nuclear option," a change in Senate rules that would ensure up or down votes on all judicial 
nominees. Just before the scheduled vote, a group of fourteen Democrats and Republicans 
came together to craft a deal that averted that vote. Charles Babington & Shailagh Murray, 
A Last-Minute Deal on Judicial Nominees, WASH. POST, May 24, 2005, at AI. For a more 
complete treatment of this issue, see generally David S. Law & Lawrence B. Solum, 
Judicial Selection, Appointments Gridlock, and the Nuclear Option, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 51 (2006). 
132 G. Calvin Mackenzie, The State of the Presidential Appointments Process, in 
INNOCENT UNTIL NOMINATED: THE BREAKDOWN OF THE PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS 
PROCESS 1, 29 (G. Calvin Mackenzie ed., 2001). 
133 Ho, supra note 2, at 28. 
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parliamentary weapons such as delayed hearings or floor votes, filibusters and 
so-called 'holds. "'134 
The increasing politicization of the confirmation process, as we will soon 
discuss, has fundamentally transformed the nomination and confirmation of 
independent-agency heads. In particular, White House vetting of independent-
agency appointments, and the Senate's corresponding power to confirm, has 
become especially consequential. Presidents cannot fire independent-agency 
heads on policy grounds and, as such, have been constrained in their efforts to 
direct independent-agency policy making. 135 In particular, unlike executive 
agencies, independent agencies need not submit their regulatory proposals to 
OMB for approval. 136 They often manage to escape OMB review of budget 
requests or at least submit their budget requests to Congress directly at the 
same time. 137 Likewise, albeit less importantly, most independent agencies 
have substantial litigation authority. Outside of Supreme Court litigation, 
which is typically controlled by the Solicitor General, the President cannot use 
the Justice Department to ensure the legal policymaking of these independent 
agencies remains consistent with presidential priorities. 138 
The following picture backs up the preceding analysis. In the post-Reagan 
era, confirmation delays of independent-agency heads have grown markedly, 
particularly for opposition-party nominations. This change closely correlates 
with political polarization, especially given that the President's Senate 
opponents increasingly see the confirmation process as a way to defend their 
policymaking prerogatives. 139 In one critical respect, the opposition party in 
the Senate has succeeded in its efforts - opposition senators regularly use holds 
and other delaying strategies to pressure the President to appoint party loyalists 
to slots held by opposition-party members. 
134 Gary J. Andres, Postcards from Sisyphus: What I Saw During the Confirmation Wars, 
35 PoL. SCI. & POL. 55, 55 (2002) (providing a firsthand account of confirmation battles 
from a member of the White House Legislative Affairs Staff). 
135 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. 
136 See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text (discussing the Reagan 
administration's rationale for excluding independent agencies from OMB review); supra 
note 113 (discussing the Clinton administration's decision to ask independent agencies to 
provide planning documents to OMB). 
137 See David E. Lewis, The Adverse Consequences of the Politics of Agency Design for 
Presidential Management in the United States: The Relative Durability of Insulated 
Agencies, 34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 377, 389-90 (2004). 
138 See generally Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control 
over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REv. 255 (1994) (discussing both pros and 
cons of this arrangement). On the perils of presidential challenges to independent litigation 
authority in court, see Devins, supra note 106, at 1042-50 (discussing Bush I's failed effort 
to seize litigation authority away from the U.S. Postal Service). 
139 Political polarization and divided government have also resulted in confirmation 
delays of the President's nomination of executive-agency heads. See McCarty & 
Razaghian, supra note 68, at 1141. 
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Figure 7: Confirmation Delay for Vacancies by Party and Pre/Post-Reagan 
Pre-Reagan Post Reagan 
• Opposition Party • President's Party 
Opposition-party success sterns from the fact that the President often makes 
multiple nominations to the same commission simultaneously because some 
commissioners decide not to complete terms at the very time that other 
commissioners' terms expire. This situation allows for "hatching": the 
opposition party demands that the President nominate a party loyalist to an 
opposition-party slot in exchange for the opposition party supporting the 
President's same-party nominations. For better or worse, hatching has become 
a common tactic in the modem appointments process. Daniel Ho has both 
statistically verified the increase and tied the increase to party polarization 
(and, coincidentally, the Reagan Revolution): "measuring 'hatching' by the 
number of nominees confirmed two days apart, 24% of nominees were hatched 
prior to 1980, compared to 48% after 1980."140 Examples of this practice 
abound, including recent appointments to the FCC, 141 the FEC, 142 the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, 143 and the National Labor Relations Board.144 In 
addition to "hatching" multiple members to the same independent agency, 
opposition-party senators pressure the President to appoint opposition-party 
140 Ho, supra note 2, at 29. 
141 See Mackenzie, supra note 132, at 33 (discussing White House-Senate negotiations 
over the appointment of four FCC commissioners in 1997, which included two Democrats 
and two Republicans). 
142 See Ben Schneider, Senators Await Reid Decision on Handling FEC Nominees, 
CONGRESS DAILY, Oct. 4, 2007 (discussing 2007 efforts to package the appointment of four 
FEC nominees, two Democrats and two Republicans). 
143 See Steve Tetreault, Reid Plans to Block Republican NRC Nominee, LAS VEGAS REV.-
J., July 18, 2007, at 2B (discussing efforts to package a Democratic and Republican 
nominee to the NRC). 
144 See Flynn, supra note 107, at 1393 n.145, 1429-32. 
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loyalists to vacant seats on an independent agency by placing "holds" on 
presidential nominees that have nothing to do with an independent-agency 
appointment. For example, Senate Republicans held up Clinton's U.N. 
ambassador pick, Richard Holbrooke, in order to secure the nomination of 
Republican Brad Smith to the FEC. 145 
Batching has profound consequences on appointments politics. Cross-party 
appointees demonstrate particular loyalty to their parties. In the post-1980 
period, according to Daniel Ho, "Republican presidents appear to appoint 
Democrats [to independent agencies] who are even more liberal than 
Democrats appointed by Democratic presidents (and vice versa)." 146 Given the 
propensity of commissioners to vote along party lines,147 the ability of the 
opposition party in the Senate to push the President this way becomes highly 
consequential. As the picture below illustrates, party loyalty affects the 
willingness of opposition-party commissioners to resign before the end of their 
terms. Consistent with claims we have made about party polarization in the 
post-Reagan era, this picture strongly suggests opposition-party commissioners 
more often see themselves as party loyalists, such that opposition-party 
commissioners more frequently serve out their terms when the President is 
from another party. Indeed, while all commissioners now remain for longer 
proportions of their terms, this is particularly the case for opposition-party 
commissioners. 
Figure 8: Commissioner Tenure by Party and Pre/Post-Reagan 
Administration 
Serve Out Full Tenn 
~ Opposition Party President's Party 
• Pre-Reagan • Post-Reagan 
145 Mackenzie, supra note 132, at 33. On occasion, majority and minority leaders of the 
Senate also orchestrate deals. See Karen Foerstel, Dozens of Clinton Nominees Win 
Confirmation After Lott Strikes Deal with Democrats, C.Q. WKLY., Nov. 13, 1999, at 2714. 
146 Ho, supra note 2, at 4. 
147 See infra notes 153-65 and accompanying text. 
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The willingness of the opposition party to do battle with the President over 
the confirmation of independent-agency heads and the willingness of 
opposition-party commissioners to serve through the end of their terms suggest 
independent agencies enjoy partial insulation from presidential control. As 
Part I made clear, the principal reason Congress chooses independent agencies 
over some other institutional design is to limit presidential prerogatives. 148 
Limitations on the President's power to remove commissioners as well as the 
mandate that the President appoint Democrats as well as Republicans speak to 
Congress's hope that opposition-party commissioners will stay in office 
through their terms and that opposition-party commissioners will act 
independently rather than simply embrace the President's policy agenda. At 
one level, it therefore appears that political polarization strengthens the 
institutional design of independent agencies - both with respect to the 
willingness of opposition-party commissioners to check the President and the 
willingness of the opposition party in the Senate to use the confirmation power 
to push for commissioners who will not simply rubberstamp the President's 
decisions. The question remains: what happens after the President is able to 
appoint a majority of commissioners from his party? For reasons we will 
detail in Part IV, it seems political polarization also contributes to greater 
presidential control of independent agencies after the President has appointed a 
majority of commissioners from his party. 
IV. CONCLUSION: HOW PARTY POLARIZATION CONTRIBUTES TO 
PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OF INDEPENDENT AGENCIES 
We have demonstrated how party polarization affects commissioner 
ideology, the willingness of commissioners to serve out their terms, and the 
willingness of the opposition party in the Senate to use delaying strategies to 
advance its agenda. 149 For reasons we will now detail, the very forces that 
make opposition-party commissioners and senators fight for opposition-party 
policy preferences also make it more likely that presidential-party 
commissioners and senators will fight for presidential preferences. 
Consequently, independent agencies more often polarize along party lines: 
they resist presidential preferences when a majority of commissioners are from 
the opposition party and support presidential preferences once a majority of 
commissioners are from the President's party. While we have not conducted 
independent empirical research to buttress our conclusion, so that it should be 
considered more impressionistic than other parts of this Article, we feel that 
common sense and existing scholarship point to the increasing identity of 
interests between the President and independent-agency commissioners from 
the president's party. 150 Aside from anecdotal stories published in newspapers 
148 See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text. 
149 See discussion supra Part Ill. 
15° For a competing perspective (limited to NLRB appointees during the Bush I and 
Clinton years), see Flynn, supra note 107, at 1413. For reasons previously detailed, we 
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(discussing policy cohesion between independent agencies and the President as 
well as the personal commitment of presidential appointees to advance 
presidential priorities),l 51 systematic studies of both commissioner voting and 
the nomination process support our claim that, in this era of party polarization, 
independent-agency heads are especially likely to support the priorities of the 
political party they represent. Moreover, the limited empirical research we 
have conducted on litigation conflicts between independent agencies and the 
Solicitor General supports our claim. 152 
As Part III makes clear, ideology plays a more pronounced role in both the 
appointment and confirmation of independent-agency heads. Starting with the 
Reagan administration, Presidents have placed greater emphasis on a 
nominee's commitment to the President's agenda. 153 For its part, the 
opposition party in the Senate has chosen to fight fire with fire - so while 
Presidents now vet for ideological conformity, the opposition party in the 
Senate makes full use of its confirmation power to ensure its nominees are 
party loyalists.154 Also, as the figure below demonstrates, party unity has 
grown markedly since the late 1970s, with both Republicans and Democrats 
voting as a unified front on roughly ninety percent of roll call votes. This 
graph illustrates the proportion of legislators voting with their own party on 
party unity votes over time. These are votes in which a majority of Democrats 
voted against a majority of Republicans. Whereas the percentages were quite 
high in the late 1800s, indicating that Democrats and Republicans rarely 
crossed party lines, the percentages were much lower by the 1950s. Members 
from one party more regularly voted with a majority of members from the 
other party on important votes in Congress. While there was slightly more 
party unity in the Senate than in the House, and some variation in unity around 
think that Flynn's analysis is not inconsistent with our claims. See supra note 107. 
Moreover, even if her analysis is inconsistent with ours and even if her data substantiate her 
claims, Flynn's analysis is limited to the NLRB. See Flynn, supra note 107, at 1365. As 
Flynn states, NLRB politics is unique in that presidents often cut a middle path in order to 
avoid choosing between business and labor interests. Id. at 1364. For that reason, Flynn 
sees Reagan's appointment of pro-business commissioners as anomalous. Id. at 1384; see 
infra note 165 and accompanying text (explaining how Reagan transformed the NLRB 
through his appointments). 
151 For example, there are several journalistic accounts of how Presidents Clinton and 
Bush II named commission chairs who were party loyalists. See, e.g., David Hatch, Is the 
FCC Free From Partisan Politics?, 2005 NAT'L. J. 2935, 2935 (quoting Clinton FCC Chair 
Reed Hundt as saying that he '"naturally ... preferred the White House to approve of [his] 
agenda"'); Stephen Labaton, Praise to Scorn: Mercurial Ride of S.E.C. Chief, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. I 0, 2002, at 1-1 (stating that Bush II SEC chair Harvey Pitt "had ultimately become a 
casualty ... struggling to remain a loyal Republican without understanding how his 
partisanship ... would alienate important Democrats"). 
152 See infra p. 497 tbl.l. 
153 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
154 See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
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the middle of the century, the steady increase in this practice after the mid-
1970s is striking. Put another way: with members of each party seeing 
themselves as agents for their party, Democrats in the Senate are apt to agree 
not just with each other but with other Democrats- whether it is a Democrat in 
the White House or Democrats who serve on independent agencies. The same 
is also true of Republicans (even more so, since there is greater intra-party 
agreement among Republicans). ISS 
Figure 9: Proportion of Legislators Voting with Their Party on Party Unity 
Votes, 1879-2006156 
House 1879·2006 
Party Unity Votes 
Party Unity: Percentage of 
Membert Voting With Their Republicans 
Party on Party Unity Votes Democrats 
1879 1895 1911 1927 1943 1959 1975 1991 
Senate 1879·2006 
Party Unity Votes 
Party Unity: Percentage of 
Members YoUng With Their Republicans 
Party on PartyUnltyVotes Dcmocrets 
1879 1896 1911 1927 1943 1959 1975 1991 
Additional support for this claim can be found in studies of decision making 
by independent agencies. 157 A study of seven independent and executive 
agencies during the Carter and Reagan administrations underscores the pivotal 
role that appointments and confirmation play in agency decision making. 158 In 
particular, although reorganizations, congressional oversight, and budgeting 
are important, "[t]he leadership of an agency is the most frequent [and most 
potent] mechanism for changing agency behavior." 159 Daniel Ho's study of 
FCC voting patterns from 1965-2006 likewise points to the pivotal role of 
appointees' party identity. By looking at roughly 100,000 votes by forty-six 
different commissioners, Ho concludes "[ c ]ommissioner partisan affiliation 
exhibits robust and large predictive power over votes, even holding constant 
155 See infra p. 493 fig.9. 
156 Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, & Howard Rosenthal, Polarized America Page, 
http://polarizedamerica.com (last visited Feb. 17, 2008). 
157 See, e.g., B. Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of Political Control 
of the Bureaucracy, 85 AM. PoL. SCI. REV. 801, 801 (1991). 
158 /d. at 801. 
159 /d. at 822. 
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the party of the appointing president. This [finding] ... rejects the notion that 
expertise exclusively drives decision making."160 Equally telling, FCC 
commissioners have taken steps to demonstrate party loyalty - so much so that 
commissioners increasingly file separate statements after a change of 
administration, so that Democrats and Republicans could establish "their 
reputations for loyalty." 161 Studies of the National Labor Relations Board 
reach a similar conclusion - pointing, for example, to the transformative role 
of Reagan appointees. These nominees were not the usual "establishment-type 
management representatives" that were acceptable to both labor and 
business. 162 Instead Reagan pushed for nominees that questioned the Board's 
traditional role. 163 In this way, Reagan's nominees were a radical departure. 164 
More significant, the Reagan Board's "pattern of decisions changed 
remarkably from that of its recent predecessors" - ruling against employers 
approximately half the time as compared to Nixon/Ford/Carter Boards that 
ruled against employers about eighty percent of the time. 165 
One final measure of increasing presidential control over independent-
agency decision making is the near absence of litigation conflicts between 
independent agencies and the Solicitor General's office. 166 During the Nixon 
and Carter administrations, these conflicts were common. 167 Even though the 
Solicitor General spoke the voice of the "United States" before the Supreme 
Court, the Solicitor General would often accommodate independent agencies' 
desires to speak with their own voices. 168 In particular, reflecting the fact that 
independent-agency decision making did not routinely match executive branch 
preferences, independent agencies would sometimes file competing briefs or 
make oral arguments that contradicted the views of the "United States."169 
These public disagreements had three sources. First, of course, there was a 
disagreement between independent-agency heads and the executive. 170 
160 Ho, supra note 2, at 4. For an anecdotal study of the FCC, focusing on how Reagan 
transformed agency decision making by appointing commissioners committed to his 
deregulatory agenda, see generally Devins, supra note I 05. 
161 Keith S. Brown & Adam Candeub, Ideology Versus Partisanship: Regulatory 
Behavior and Cyclical Political Influence 10 (Legal Stud. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 
04-10, 2006). 
162 James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB's Uncertain Future, 26 COMP. 
LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 221, 248 (2005). 
163 Id. 
164 !d. 
165 Id. For additional discussion of the NLRB, see supra notes 140-47 and 
accompanying text. 
166 See infra p. 497 tbl.l. 
167 For a fairly comprehensive detailing of significant litigation disputes between 
independent agencies and the Solicitor General, see Devins, supra note 138, at 258-59. 
168 Id. at 258. 
169 See id. at 264. 
170 Id. at 280. 
HeinOnline -- 88 B.U. L. Rev.  495 2008
2008] NOT-SO INDEPENDENT AGENCIES 495 
Second, since several independent agencies have independent litigating 
authority before the federal courts of appeal, independent agencies had 
sometimes staked out a position at odds with the Solicitor General's 
preferences. 171 Third, even though the Solicitor General controls nearly all 
government litigation before the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General thought 
it appropriate to inform the Court of both its views and competing 
independent-agency views. 172 Carter Attorney General Griffin Bell, for 
example, emphasized that Justice Department lawyers "must take care not to 
interfere with the policy prerogatives of our agency clients."173 
Over the past twenty-five years, there has been a precipitous decline in the 
filing of competing Supreme Court briefs by independent agencies and the 
Solicitor Genera1. 174 Starting with Reagan administration efforts to have the 
executive speak with a "unitary" voice, Presidents have placed great emphasis 
on intra-governmental policy cohesion when appointing independent-agency 
heads. 175 Reflecting the Reagan administration view that "the Attorney 
General's obligation to represent and advocate the 'client' agency's position 
must yield to a higher obligation to [follow the President's lead and] take care 
that the laws be executed faithfully," the executive did everything it could to 
push its agenda before the courts. 176 Indeed, the Reagan and Bush I 
administrations pushed unitariness even when independent agencies publicly 
disagreed with executive branch views. 177 In highly visible cases involving the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the U.S. Postal 
Service, White House officials sought to convince the independent agency 
either to reverse itself or to allow - in cases before federal courts of appeals -
the Justice Department to present a unified government position, 
notwithstanding the fact that these agencies have independent litigation 
authority before federal courts of appeal. 178 More recently, the Clinton and 
Bush II administrations have prevented the Federal Election Commission and 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from presenting their independent 
views to the Supreme Court. 179 
171 See id. at 274-78 (detailing statutory delegations of independent litigating authority to 
independent agencies). 
172 /d. at 258. 
173 Griffin B. Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal Government's Chief Lawyer and 
Chief Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 1049, 1061 (1978). For a 
fuller discussion of Bell's position, contrasting it to the views of the Reagan administration, 
see Devins, supra note 50, at 281-82. 
174 Devins, supra note 138, at 288. 
175 !d. at 285-86. 
176 Devins, supra note 50, at 281 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
177 !d. at 282. 
178 Seeid. at284-312. 
179 Jonathan Eisenberg, Beyond the Basics: Seventy-Five Defenses Securities Litigators 
Need To Know, 62 Bus. LAW. 1281, 1293 (2007); George F. Fraley, III, Note, Is the Fox 
HeinOnline -- 88 B.U. L. Rev.  496 2008
496 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:459 
Far more striking, the Bush II administration disagreement with the SEC 
stands alone. Today, there are almost no public disagreements between 
independent agencies and the Solicitor Genera1. 180 As the following table 
illustrates, there were no competing filings of four prominent independent 
agencies (EEOC, NLRB, FCC, SEC) and the Solicitor General during the 
1995-2004 period. Moreover, while there were nine cases out of 157 where 
the independent agency did not sign onto a Solicitor General brief, a review of 
these cases reveals no merits conflicts between these independent agencies and 
the Solicitor General. In dramatic contrast, there were numerous conflicts and 
competing filings with all four of these agencies before 1995, and especially 
before 1981, when Ronald Reagan became President. 181 
Watching the Henhouse?: The Administration's Control of FEC Litigation Through the 
Solicitor General, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1215, 1219 (1996). 
180 See infra p 497 tbl.1. 
181 See Devins, supra note 50, at 282. 
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Table 1: Filing of Supreme Court Briefs by Independent Commissions, 
1970s to 2004 
EEOC 1970s 1995-2004 
Joint 4/5 (80%) 16/16 (100%) 
Agency 0/5 0/16 
SG 1/5 (20%) 0/16 
Competing 1/5 (20%) 0/16 
NLRB 1970s 1995-2004 
Joint 49/49 (100%) 67/67 (100%) 
Agency 0/49 0/67 
SG 0/49 0/67 
Competing 0/49 0/67 
FCC 1970s 1995-2004 
Joint 5/8 (63%) 51/59 (86%) 
Agency 118 (13%) 0/59 
SG 0/8 8/59 (14%) 
Competing 2/8 (25%) 0/59 
SEC 1970s 1995-2004 
Joint 5/6 (83%) 14/15 (93%) 
Agency 016 0/15 
SG 116 (17%) 1115 (7%) 
Competing 016 0/15 
Total 1970s 1995-2004 
Joint 63/68 (93%) 148/157 (94o/ol 
Agency 1168 (1%) 0/157 
SG 2/68 (3%) 9/157 (6%) 
Competing 2/68 (3%) 0/157 
It is time to wrap up. This Article has demonstrated that the independent-
agency institutional design is working as well as it can. The very purpose of 
this design was to limit presidential control of independent agencies in two 
ways. First, when assuming office, a President would inherit commissioners 
from both his party and the opposition party. Congress hoped that opposition-
party commissioners would stay in office through the ends of their terms -
thereby limiting presidential control of independent agencies. 182 As Figures 1 
and 2 show, opposition-party commissioners serve out most, if not all, of their 
terms. For this very reason, as Figure 3 illustrates, it now takes the President 
longer than ever before to appoint a majority from his party to an independent 
agency. Second, Congress hoped that opposition-party senators would use 
182 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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their confirmation power to resist presidential efforts to stack independent 
agencies with appointees who backed presidential preferences. 183 As Part III 
demonstrated, opposition-party senators are pressuring the President this way. 
Through the use of holds and other delaying strategies, which result in the 
hatching of nominees from the President's party and the opposition party, the 
opposition party has succeeded in forcing the President - when making cross-
party appointments - to appoint opposition-party loyalists. Figure 4 backs up 
this claim, highlighting increased delays in the confirmation process. The 
subsequent discussion, demonstrating that cross-party appointees are especially 
ideological, also backs up this claim. 
That the institutional design is working as well as it can, however, does not 
mean Presidents have less actual control of independent agencies. As we have 
detailed in this Part, there is good reason to think that independent agencies 
will adhere to presidential preferences once a majority of commissioners are 
from the President's party. In particular, party identity is an especially good 
proxy for commissioner voting practices. This is tied to two phenomena -
both of which can be traced to party polarization (and the Reagan Revolution 
that contributed to today's polarization). First, as Part III demonstrates, 
Presidents look to appoint independent-agency heads who are committed to the 
President's policy agenda. Second, as discussed in Parts III and IV, there is no 
meaningful ideological gap among Democrats or Republicans. As Figures 6 
and 7 show, Democrats are likely to agree with each other and disagree with 
Republicans (and vice versa). Party cohesion is not limited to senators; it 
applies to independent-agency heads and the President. 
Our bottom line is that party polarization plays a defining role in 
understanding President-Senate-Commissioner dynamics. Party polarization 
makes it likely that opposition-party senators and opposition-party 
commissioners will try to check presidential power; party polarization also 
contributes to the President's ultimate dominion over independent-agency 
decision making. 
183 See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
